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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
Morgan appeals from a trial de novo review of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding before the drivers' license division (R. 58). After a trial, the court concluded 
that Morgan was driving while under the influence and, consequently, "affirm[ed] the one 
year suspension of driving privileges" (R. 63). This Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996). 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Given that Morgan's one-year license suspension has expired, is his appeal 
moot? 
2. Assuming the appeal is not moot, did Morgan fail to satisfy a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to judicial review by failing to request an administrative hearing? This issue 
is a matter of law and the Court gives no deference to the trial court's decision. 
3. Has Morgan waived any error the trial court may have committed in 
allegedly failing to allow him closing argument by not objecting or claiming plain error 
on appeal? Because this issue was not before the trial court, there is no standard of 
review. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Relevant statutes are included in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
Appellant Morgan was served with a citation after being stopped for DUI on July 
25,1997 ((Tr. Hearing, Morgan v. Blackstock, Case No. 970700374, Jan. 20, 1998, at 5, 
22).] That citation informed him that he had 10 days to ask for a hearing before the 
drivers' license division; however, he never made such a request (R. 17). Consequently, 
the division suspended his license in an order dated August 17,1997 (Id.). Less than 30 
lrThe transcript has not been indexed. 
Page 2 of 14 
days later, on September 16,1997, Morgan filed a petition for judicial review under the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act for a trial de novo (R. 1). 
Because Morgan failed to request an administrative hearing, the division moved in 
the trial court to dismiss the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (R. 20). 
The trial court denied the motion and the case went to evidentiary hearing, after which the 
court concluded that Morgan was properly stopped for suspicion of driving under the 
influence, that he was, in fact, under the influence, and that his license should be 
suspended (R. 60). The suspension began August 23,1997 and lasted for one year (R. 
17). The record does not indicate that the suspension was ever stayed. 
Statement of Facts1 
At the end of the division's case, both parties engaged in lengthy arguments about 
admission of exhibits (Tr. at 43-51). Afterward, the trial court began to state its ruling 
when Morgan's counsel interrupted and the following colloquy ensued. 
Mr. Oliver: Your Honor, I don't mean to interrupt the court. We'd at least 
like to be given the opportunity to either present evidence or 
not present evidence. I have not been asked that. 
The Court: Excuse me. Do you wish to present evidence? 
Mr. Oliver: We'd also like to make closing argument. 
The Court: Do you wish to present evidence? 
2Because Morgan does not challenge the trial court's ruling that he was, in fact, 
driving while under the influence, the division will not restate those evidentiary facts. 
Mr. Oliver: At this time we do not desire to put Mr. Morgan on and we're 
not going to present any evidence. I do have closing argument. 
The Court: I think I've heard all your arguments I want to hear. That's 
my ruling. I'll make my ruling now. You've argued the legal 
aspects of the case. I think I know what your other arguments 
will be. I'll make a ruling in the matter. I'll proceed now, 
thank you. 
(Tr. at 51-52). 
At the conclusion of the ruling, the court asked Morgan's counsel if he had any 
additional matters, and the following discussion took place. 
The Court: Are there any other matters, Mr. Oliver, you wish to bring to 
the court's attention? 
Mr. Oliver: The court doesn't mean by way of argument, does it? 
The Court: No, I don't. 
Mr. Oliver: There's some significant issues, but that's okay. 
The Court: I don't think there are any that haven't been treated, Mr. 
Oliver 
(Tr. at 56). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mootness: Morgan's appeal should be dismissed as moot because his 
suspension is no longer in effect, having ended on August 23, 1998, and he does not even 
claim that any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: Morgan failed to request an administrative 
hearing before the division but went straight to district court. By failing to request a 
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hearing, Morgan failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and this Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Waiver and No Abuse of Discretion: The trial court acted within its discretion 
when it refused to hear additional argument from Morgan's counsel because he had, in 
fact, already given lengthy argument on the merits and the testimony was straightforward 
and uncomplicated. Additionally, Morgan waived the claimed error by not objecting and 
by not telling this Court, in his brief, what issues he would have raised had he been given 
closing argument. Consequently, Morgan cannot show prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
L BECAUSE MORGAN'S LICENSE SUSPENSION 
ENDED ON AUGUST 23,1998, THE RELIEF HE 
REQUESTS, I.E., LIFTING OF THE SUSPENSION, IS 
NO LONGER MEANINGFUL OR PRACTICAL; 
CONSEQUENTLY, HIS APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED AS MOOT. 
Due to Morgan's drunken driving, a fact not challenged on appeal, the division 
suspended his license for one year, beginning August 23,1997 (R. 17). That one-year 
period, which was unstayed, expired on August 23,1998. "Utah courts have consistently 
refused to hear the merits of driver's license revocation appeals rendered moot because 
the revocation period has expired." Phillips v. Schwendiman, 802 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 
App. 1990); see also Jones v. Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1986); Cullimore v. 
Schwendiman, 652 P.2d 915 (Utah 1982); Moon v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 822 (Utah 
App. 1987); Gabbardv. Beach, 736 P.2d 1047 (Utah App. 1987). 
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Though a court can decide a technically moot case if the issue it presents 
significantly affects the public interest and is capable of evading future appellate review, 
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413,415 (Utah App. 1987), Morgan makes no claim that 
his appeal fits within that narrow category. Consequently, deciding this matter on the 
merits would result in an advisory opinion, which "judicial policy dictates against." 
Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409,410-11 (Utah 1982). The appeal should be 
dismissed for mootness. Utah R.App. P. 37 (1998) (requiring parties to notify court when 
case appears moot). 
II. SHOULD THIS COURT DECIDE TO REACH THE 
MERITS, MORGAN'S APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED BECAUSE HE FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND, THEREFORE, 
THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION. 
Morgan did not request a hearing before the division, as he could have under Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6)(a) (1996). By failing to do so, he also failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, a necessity under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)("A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available ....") (emphasis added). 
In his trial court memorandum opposing dismissal, Morgan claimed that he only 
failed to request "reconsideration" of the division's final order (R. 33). This is incorrect. 
The hearing that Morgan did not request was one in which he could have called and 
cross-examined witnesses, including the officer who stopped him, not merely a 
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"reconsideration" where the original hearing officer re-evaluates his decision. Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-3-223(6)(a) (1996).3 
The trial court's denial of the division's motion to dismiss sends an unfortunate 
message: that the division's administrative process, carefully established by the 
legislature, can be ignored at will. In its order denying the motion, the trial court relied 
on the part of section 63-46b-14(2)(a) that says exhaustion is not mandated when a statute 
says it is not required4 (R. 48). It ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-224 (1996) is such a 
3
 (6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an opportunity 
to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be made within 
ten days of the date of the arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in which the arrest 
occurred, unless the division and the person agree that the hearing may be held in some other 
county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and 
the production of relevant books and papers; 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-4. 
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any number of the members of the division 
is as valid as if made after a hearing before the full membership of the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a 
motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as 
required in the notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor 
vehicle is suspended or not. 
4
 The specific provision reads: "[A] party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required." 
Page 7 of 14 
statute. To the contrary, that statute merely states: "a person denied a license or whose 
license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked by the division may seek judicial 
review of the division's order." The trial court stated that this statute fulfilled the no-
exhaustion requirement of section 63-46b-14 by "specifically omitting a need to exhaust 
any administrative remedies first" (R. 48). 
The trial court's interpretation requires that the legislature expressly command 
exhaustion. To the contrary, Subsection 63-46b-14(2)(a) makes exhaustion the default; if 
the petitioner wants to avoid exhaustion, the statute must contain an affirmative statement 
that exhaustion is not required. The driver's license provision to which Morgan refers is 
no such statement. It merely gives a petitioner authority to file for judicial review. In this 
way, it is similar to statutes Utah's appellate courts have interpreted in two previous 
cases, rejecting interpretations like the trial court's as "disingenuous." 
Statutory language giving district courts jurisdiction to review formal and informal 
adjudicative proceedings from the Department of Transportation did not allow Kunz & 
Company to ignore administrative proceedings and go directly to court. Kunz & 
Company v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 770 (Utah App. 1996). Similarly, the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled in State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm fn of Utah, 904 P.2d 236, 
238 (Utah 1995) that UAPA "does not create the option of seeking either administrative 
relief or judicial review." Indeed, UAPA "embodies the general principle that a party 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(a) (1996). 
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must exhaust its administrative remedies prior to obtaining judicial review." Id. This 
Court, in Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95,99 (Utah App. 1998), held 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory in order to "allow an 
administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence - to make a 
factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own error so as to moot judicial 
controversies." Absent exhaustion, states Horn, the courts have no jurisdiction to do 
anything other than dismiss the case. Id. at 101. 
Consequently, contrary to the trial court's view, the provision in UAPA at 
Subsection 63-46b-14(2) requiring exhaustion is mandatory and it sets forth a 
jurisdictional prerequisite. It allows judicial review only after exhausting available 
administrative remedies. The two exceptions for exhaustion do not apply here and, in any 
event, Morgan has not alleged that his failure to exhaust is excusable. He simply has 
ignored the prerequisite. Courts from other states also recognize that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Crestwood Hospital & Nursing 
Home, Inc. v. State Health Planning Agency, 670 So.2d 45, 47 (Ala. 1995) (failure to file 
notice of appeal to administrative board precluded judicial review); Lopiano v. City of 
Stamford, 577 A.2d 1135,1136 (Conn. App. 1990) ("well settled principle of 
administrative law that a party may not bring a matter to the Superior Court without first 
exhausting available administrative remedies"); Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock 
County, 804 P.2d 294,297 (Idaho 1990) (district court does not acquire subject matter 
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jurisdiction until all administrative remedies have been exhausted); Thompson v. 
Peterson, 546 N.W.2d 856, 860 (N.D. 1996) ("Failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
generally precludes making a claim in court."); Stallings v. Oklahoma Tax Com % 880 
P.2d 912, 915 (Okla. 1994) (court cannot dispense with statutorily-imposed jurisdictional 
prerequisites). 
III. EVEN IF MORGAN DID NOT WAIVE ANY 
OBJECTION HE MAY HAVE HAD TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO HEAR CLOSING 
ARGUMENT, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING. 
A. Morgan waived his objection when he told the court 
"that's okay55 in response to the court5s statement 
that it would not hear closing argument. 
At the conclusion of the ruling, the court asked Morgan's counsel if he had any 
other matters (Tr. at 56). Informed that the court was not interested in hearing argument, 
counsel nevertheless said "[t]here's some significant issues, but that's okay" (Id). Never 
did counsel tell the court even the essence of what those "significant issues" were or how 
they had not been previously discussed. Consequently, Morgan waived any error that 
may have occurred by the trial court's refusal to hear more argument. State v. Kiriluk, 
slip op., at 7-8, Case No. 971200-CA (Utah App. Feb. 11,1999). 
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B. Because Morgan does not even state in his 
brief what those "significant issues9' were, 
this Court cannot tell if the trial court would 
have changed its decision had it heard them. 
Nowhere in Morgan's brief does he present the "significant issues" that the trial 
court purportedly refused to hear. Consequently, it is impossible to determine the true 
effect of the court's "refusal." Indeed, Morgan's silence, and his failure to allege that he 
was, in fact, not driving while intoxicated, indicates that there are no other issues yet to be 
argued. Cf. State v. Preece, 358 Utah Adv. Rep. 41,43 (Utah App. Dec. 17, 1998) 
(proffer necessary at trial court level to show evidence that would have been excluded). 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to hear additional argument 
Morgan fails to mention that he, in fact, argued the merits of the case. He claimed 
that the evidence established procedural failures in service of the citation (Tr. at 49-50) 
and the meaning of prior case law (Tr. at 50). The alleged failure of the peace officer to 
mail his copy of the citation within five days of the arrest was the heart of Morgan's case. 
His counsel extensively argued that the five-day rule was mandatory and stripped the 
division of jurisdiction. Given Morgan's failure to challenge the evidence about the stop 
or his intoxication, this procedural challenge was the sole issue. He was allowed to argue. 
Simply because neither Morgan nor the court categorized it as "closing argument" makes 
no difference. 
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In any event, this was a civil, non-jury trial and Morgan cites to no cases that hold 
closing argument is a right in these proceedings. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 
1209 (Utah 1983), to which Morgan also refers for support is of no real help to him. It 
merely "demand[s] procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." Id. 
The trial court is in the best position to determine what procedures are appropriate. Here, 
the court had just heard evidence in a trial that took 43 pages to transcribe. Morgan had 
called no witnesses of his own. The court made a detailed, oral ruling that went on for 
four transcript pages (Tr. at 52-56). The situation was close to that described in Korbelik 
v. Staschke, 596 N.E.2d 805, 808 (111. App. 1992), where the Illinois Court of Appeals 
upheld a trial court's refusal to hear closing argument. There, in a colloquy remarkably 
similar to the one that occurred here, the Illinois trial court told defendant it did not need 
closing argument. 
The Court: I think we can save some time, gentlemen. I don't think 
closing argument is needed 
Plaintiffs Counsel: Your Honor, could I - could I speak to the Court to 
summarize. 
The Court: I tell you, I got about 10 pages here, and I have been writing 
down, and I think I am pretty well aware of the testimony that 
has been given in this case. 
Plaintiffs Counsel: Okay. 
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion. As evidenced by its detailed 
ruling, it had been listening to the testimony, which was uncomplicated and 
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straightforward. Further, it had, in fact, listened to Morgan make lengthy argument about 
alleged procedural failures on the part of the division. There was no abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Morgan's appeal should be dismissed as moot. But if the Court chooses to reach 
the merits, it should dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as discussed in point 
II. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS [$_ February 1999. 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney Genera? 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the influence — Temporary license — 
Hearing and decision — Suspension and fee — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating 
or has violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain 
blood or breath alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, 
alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the person, request 
that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with 
the standards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar local 
ordinance adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a 
chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6 shall, 
and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's 
license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or 
breath alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6, or if the officer makes 
a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in violation of 
Section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the test or making the 
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of the 
division's intention to suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division he 
shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be approved by the division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division. 
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the division, 
serve also as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division within five days 
after the date of arrest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the division indicating the chemical test 
results, if any; and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has violated 
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6. 
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an opportunity 
to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be made 
within ten days of the date of the arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in which the arrest 
occurred, unless the division and the person agree that the hearing may be held in some 
other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was 
driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6; 
(:i) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers; 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees,and mileage from the Transportation Fund 
in accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-4. 
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any number of the members of the 
division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the full membership of the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive 
a motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as 
required in the notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a 
motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this 
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the 
arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a period of one 
year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed 
under Subsection 53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 
53-3-105 to cover administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's driving 
privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed 
division hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this 
subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the 
matter which, if held, is governed by Section 53-3-224. 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions 
where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this 
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to 
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3) (b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as 
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
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LORENZO MILLER - 5761 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION 
Civil No. 970700374 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court 
for hearing on Friday, January 20, 1998, the Honorable Rodney M. 
Page, district Court Judge presiding, the Petitioner appearing in 
person and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, the Respondent 
appearing through counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney 
General, and the Court having previously made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the action taken by 
the Respondent suspending the Petitioner's driving privileges for 
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STEPHEN LYNN MORGAN, * 
* 
Petitioner, * 
vs. * 
• 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU * 
CHIEF, DRIVER LICENSE * 
DIVISION, * 
• 
Respondents. * 
a period of one year commencing August 23, 1997, shall be and is 
hereby affirmed. 
DATED this \\t* day of Sebrnsry, 1997. 
BY THE COURT; 
Approved as to form: 
AtL 
tJORABLJP RODNEY HONOR E V M T PAGE 
District Court Judge 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AFFIRMING ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUSPENSION tc the :?ilcv:i"7 this L< w r> — vo^v-M^r^' - C C Q 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
180 SOUTH 300 WEST, STE 210 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-1218 
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LORENZO MILLER - 5761 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - 123l' 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN LYNN MORGAN, * 
Petitioner, * 
• 
vs. * 
• 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU * 
CHIEF, DRIVER LICENSE * 
DIVISION, * 
• 
Respondents. * 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court 
for hearing on Friday, January 20, 1998, the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page, district Court Judge presiding, the Petitioner appearing L:I 
person and chrcugh counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, the Rerpor.der.t: 
appearing through counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney 
General, the Court having heard the testimony presented by the 
parties and argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
r i .:. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 970700374 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
1. On July 25, 1997, Officer Travis Lyman was flagged 
down by a citizen regarding an intoxicated individual leaving a 
bar. 
2. The officer pulled the Petitioner over after seeing 
the Petitioner drive under the speed limit and that Petitioner's 
vehicle had a large crack in the windshield in the driver's line 
of vision. 
3. The officer arrested the Petitioner for driving 
under the influence based upon the strong odor of alcohol which 
the officer detected combined with the Petitioner's poor balance, 
his inability to perform field sobriety tests and his admission 
that he had been drinking. 
4. The Petitioner's driving privileges were subject to 
a one year suspension for his driving a motor vehicle with a 
breath alcohol content in excess of .08% for a second violation. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact 
now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Petitioner was operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44. 
2. The Petitioner was lawfully arrested, the initial 
stop being justified by the officer's reasonable suspicion and 
the arrest being supported by probable cause. 
3. The Court should enter an order affirming the one 
year suspension of the Petitioner's driving privileges. 
DATED this itf^  day of tebraaxy, 1998 
BY THE COURT: 
HOtoORAB^ E RODNEY M. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following this D-d* day of February, 
1398 : 
L. BR'SZE uiilVER 
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